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CONSTRUCTION UNION HIRING HALLS: SERVICE
UNDER A COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT
AS A PREREQUISITE TO HIGH PRIORITY REFERRAL
LESLIE W. BAILEY, JR.*
As an employment agency, the union hiring hall can be helpful to
"hardhats" and their employers in the building and construction in-
dustry. Employment tenure in this industry is intermittent, and hard-
hats work on a job-by-job basis on projects that frequently are short-
lived.' Because the separation in location and time of different
projects undertaken by a particular contractor renders permanent
employment relationships uneconomical, most workers must seek new
employment at the completion of each job, and their employers must
forecast labor needs and recruit for upcoming projects. Union hiring
halls can supply construction contractors with manpower efficiently,
while simultaneously providing for maximum continuity of employ-
ment for hardhats within the construction industry's unique circum-
stances.
2
A construction worker's decision to seek employment through a
hiring hall referral system, however, is not always voluntary. Fre-
quently, a person cannot apply for work at the job site or otherwise
deal directly with the contractor because an exclusive hiring arrange-
ment exists between the contractor and a union. Collective bargaining
agreements may grant the union exclusive authority to refer workers
on a priority basis 3 to all projects undertaken while the contract is
* B.A., University of North Carolina; J.D., College of William and Mary.
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1. S. REP. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1959), reprinted in I NLRB,
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DIsCLosURE
ACT, 1959, at 423-24 (1959) [hereinafter cited as LEGISLATIVE HISTORY].
2. For commentary on hiring halls see Craig, Hiring Hall Arrangements and
Practices, 9 LAB. L.J. 939 (1958); Fenton, Union Hiring Halls Under the Taft-
Hartley Act, 9 LAB. L.J. 505 (1958); Kavarsky, Union Security, Hiring Halls,
Right-to-Work Laws and the Supreme Court, 15 LAB. L.J. 659 (1964); Rains,
Construction Trades Hiring Halls, 10 LAB. L.J. 363 (1959); Rothman, The
Development and Current Status of the Law Pertaining to Hiring Hall Arrange-
ments, 40 VA. L. REV. 871 (1962); Note, Unilateral Union Control of Hiring
Halls: The Wrong and the Remedy, 70 YALE L.J. 661 (1961).
3. The priority referral provisions involved in Bechtel Power Corp., 223
N.L.R.B. 925, [1975-76] NLRB Dec. f 16,750 (1976), modified, 229 N.L.R.B. No.
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84, [1977-78] NLRB Dec. 18,159 (1977), typify those usually contained in an
exclusive hiring agreement. Article V of the Bechtel Power agreement states:
Section 5.00
In the interest of maintaining an efficient system of production in the
industry, providing for an orderly procedure of referral of applicants
for employment, preserving the legitimate interest of the employees in
their employment status within the area and of eliminating discrimi-
nation in employment because of membership or non-membership in
the Union, the parties hereto agree to the following system of referral
of applicants for employment:
Section 5.01
The Union shall be the sole and exclusive source of referrals of
applicants for employment.
Section 5.02
The Employer shall have the right to reject any applicant for em-
ployment.
Section 5.03
The Union shall select and refer applicants for employment without
discrimination against such applicants by reason of membership or
non-membership in the Union and such selection and referral shall not
be affected in any way by rules, regulations, by-laws, constitutional
provisions or any other aspect or obligation of Union membership
policies or requirements. All such selections and referral shall be in
accordance with the following procedure:
Section 5.04
The Union shall maintain a register of applicants for employment
established on the basis of the groups listed below. Each applicant for
employment shall be registered in the highest priority group for which
he qualifies.
Section 5.05
Certain qualifications, knowledge, experience are required of anyone
being referred as a journeyman electrician.
Section 5.06 Group I
All applicants for employment who have four (4) or more years ex-
perience in the trade, are residents of the geographical area constituting
the normal construction labor market, have passed a journeyman's
examination given by a duly constituted Local Union of the IBEW,
and who have been employed for a period of at least one (1) year in the
last four (4) years under a collective bargaining agreement between
the parties of this Addendum.
Section 5.07 Group II
All applicants for employment who have four (4) or more years ex-
perience in the trade, and who have passed a journeyman's examination
given by a duly constituted Local Union of the IBEW.
Section 5.08 Group III
All applicants for employment who have two (2) or more years ex-
perience in the trade, are residents of the geographical [area] consti-
tuting the normal construction labor market and who have been em-
ployed for at least six (6) months in the last three (3) years in the




in force,4 usually from one to three years.5 Section 8 (f) of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act (NLRA)c authorizes such referral agree-
ments, which customarily are made before the hiring of any workers.7
Section 8 (f) permits employers signatory to contracts establishing
hiring halls to recognize the union as the bargaining representative
Section 5.09 Group IV
All applicants for employment who have worked at the trade for more
than one (1) year.
Section 5.10
If the registration list is exhausted and the Union is unable to refer
applicants for employment to the Employer within 48 hours from the
time of receiving the Employer's request, Saturdays and holidays ex-
cepted, the Employer shall be free to secure applicants without using
the referral procedure, but such applicants, if hired, shall have the
status of temporary employees. The Employer shall notify the Business
Manager promptly of the names and Social Security numbers of such
temporary employees, and shall replace such temporary employees as
soon as registered applicants for employment are available under the
referral procedure.
(emphasis supplied).
4. The Supreme Court recently has held that a contractor does not commit an
unfair labor practice under § 8(a) (5) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29
U.S.C. § 158 (a) (5) (1970), by refusing to honor a prehire agreement negotiated
with a union that had not yet obtained majority support. NLRB v. Local 103,
Int'l Ass'n of Bridge, Structural and Ornamental Iron Workers, 98 S. Ct. 651,
658 (1978). Therefore, the union may extract an exclusive hiring agreement
from an employer, but the agreement is unenforceable until the union attains a
majority status. Id. at 659-61.
5. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 1, at 424.
6. 29 U.S.C. § 158(f) (1971). Section 8(f) states in pertinent part:
It shall not be an unfair labor practice.., for an employer engaged
primarily in the building and construction industry to make an agree-
ment covering employees engaged (or who, upon their employment, will
be engaged) in the building and construction industry with a labor
organization of which building and construction employees are mem-
bers . . . because (1) the majority status of such labor organization
has not been established.., prior to the making of such agreement...
or (3) such agreement requires the employer to notify such labor
organization of opportunities for employment with such employer, or
gives such employer labor organization an opportunity to refer qualified
applicants for such employment, or (4) such agreement specifies
minimum training or experience qualifications for employment or
provides for priority in opportunities for employment based upon
length of service with such employer, in the industry or in the par-
ticular geographical area. . ..
7. LEGIsLATIvE HISTORY, supra note 1, at 424-25. But see Wilhoit & Gibson,
Can a State Right-to-Work Law Prohibit the Union-Operated Hiring Hall, 26
LAB. L.J. 301 (1975), which argues that § 8(f) does not specifically permit ex-
clusive hiring halls. Id. at 306.
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of employees not yet hired. Consequently, many potential employees
participate neither in the selection of a bargaining representative s
nor in the establishment of the referral system. In the legislative his-
tory accompanying section 8(f) Congress observed: "The practice
of signing such agreements for future employment is not entirely
consistent with Wagner Act rulings of the NLRB [National Labor
Relations Board] that exclusive bargaining contracts can lawfully
be concluded only if the union makes its agreement after a repre-
sentative number of employees have been hired." 0 Nevertheless, Con-
gress sanctioned prehire agreements in the construction industry so
that contractors could calculate labor costs before bidding on a proj-
ect and could have a pool of skilled workers available for quick re-
ferral.' 0
In permitting prehire agreements section 8 (f) arguably provides to
the building trades a partial exemption from the important labor law
policy reflected in section 7 of the NLRA," which grants employees
the choice either of bargaining through representatives of their own
choosing or of refraining from participation in the activities of labor
organizations. 12 This deviation from policy commends a narrow con-
struction of section 8 (f) that places no greater a burden on a con-
struction worker's ability to exercise his section 7 rights than is
required to fulfill the needs of the building industry. 13 Recognizing
the unions' potential abuse of an exclusive job referral power, both
Congress and the Supreme Court have limited the types of provisions
that may be incorporated into prehire agreements. Thus, contractual
provisions establishing the priority of referral for job applicants
8. Section 8(f) (1) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(f) (1) (1970) provides an
exception to § 9 of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1970), which requires that
collective bargaining representatives initially be selected by a majority vote of
employees.
9. LEGISLATIvE HISTORY, supra note 1, at 424.
10. Id.
11. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970).
12. Section 7 explicitly articulates only one exception to this broad labor policy:
an employer and a labor organization that has achieved majority status may
establish a security agreement requiring employees to join the union after
obtaining employment. Id. See NLRA, § 8(a) (3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (3) (1970).
In the building and construction industry, § 8(f) permits inclusion of a similar
provision in a prehire agreement. Id. § 8(f) (2), 29 U.S.C. § 158(f) (2) (1970).
13. The Supreme Court has stated: "The only special consideration given
[unions] in organizational campaigns is § 8(f), which allows 'pre-hire' agree-
ments in the construction industry, but only under careful safeguards preserving
workers' rights to decline union representation." Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers
Local 100, 421 U.S. 616, 632 (1975).
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must be based on objective criteria 14 that do not interfere excessively
with workers' rights subsequently to select their own bargaining
agent.1
Although many provisions could comply with these liberal require-
ments, several unions have included a priority referral provision in
their prehire agreements that may exceed permissible legal limits.'6
Under this provision, before a construction worker can qualify for
the highest priority referral group he must have worked a designated
number of years pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement be-
tween the signatories to the present contract, regardless of his skill,
experience, or prior job performance. 7 Such a priority referral mech-
anism may protect workers who reside in an area from itinerant
laborers' employment competition and may extend preference to em-
ployees who have previous experience, either with an employer or
in an industry. Section 8(f) (4) authorizes both objectives: prehire
agreements may specify "minimum training or experience qualifi-
cations for employment or [provide] for priority in opportunities for
employment based upon length of service with such employer, in the
industry or in the particular geographical area." 's
The specific provisions in question, however, award priority ac-
cording to service under a collective bargaining agreement and do
not contain section 8 (f) (4)'s limiting language. Consequently, their
practical application could produce results not specifically authorized
by section 8(f). Nevertheless, the NLRB upheld the validity of this
employment priority mechanism in Interstate Electric Co., decided in
1977.19 In Interstate Electric the NLRB also gave an expansive inter-
14. See notes 39-41 infra & accompanying text.
15. See text accompanying notes 31-38 infra.
16. See Interstate Elec. Co., 227 N.L.R.B. -, [1976-77] NLRB Dec. f 17,848
(1977); Local 68 (Howard Electric), 227 N.L.R.B. -, [1976-77] NLRB Dec.
f 17,847 (1977); Bechtel Power Corp., 223 N.L.R.B. 925, [1975-76] NLRB Dec.
16,750 (1976), modified, 229 N.L.R.B. No. 84, [1977-78] NLRB Dec. 1 18,159
(1977); Local 77, Int'l Bhd. of Painters and Allied Trades (Colorite, Inc.), 222
N.L.R.B. 607, [1975-76] NLRB Dec. 1 17,113 (1976); Nassau-Suffolk Chapter of
Nat'l Elec. Contractor's Ass'n, Inc., 215 N.L.R.B. 894, [1974-75] NLRB Dec. ff
15,383 (1974).
17. For the relevant text of a typical prehire agreement establishing a priority
referral system based on service under the agreement see §§ 5.04-.09 of the
collective bargaining agreement quoted at note 3 supra.
18. NLRA, § 8(f) (4), 29 U.S.C. § 158(f) (4) (1970).
19. 227 N.L.R.B. -, -, [1976-77] NLRB Dec. 1 17,847, at 29, 618 (1977).
Prior to Interstate Electric the NLRB had held that a collective bargaining agree-
ment giving priority referral because of previous work under a bargaining
agreement "penalize[d] employees for having exercised their statutory right to
refrain from bargaining collectively through (the Union) in the past, while
1977]
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pretation to the term "such employer" in section 8 (f) (4), holding
that the words not only signify a particular employer signatory to the
agreement and for whom a potential employee has worked but also
include any member of a multi-employer association signing the
agreement or any employer consenting to be bound thereby while per-
forming work in the union's jurisdiction.20
The NLRB's decision in Interstate Electric will force employers
who subscribe to or consent to be bound by an established multi-
employer prehire agreement to extend priority employment status to
workers whose experience under the collective bargaining agreement
has enabled them to reach the top priority groups. To accommodate
these workers, the entering employer may be required to discharge
longstanding employees simply because they have not worked under
the agreement. Interstate Electric thus creates for at least one group
of workers an extreme hardship that may be unauthorized by section
8 (f) and therefore violative of their section 7 rights. This Article
evaluates whether the priority referral system approved in Interstate
Electric conforms to the limitations placed on section 7 by section
8 (f). It concludes that, under the NLRB's interpretation of "such
employer," the priority mechanism is inconsistent with the purposes
of the section 8 (f) exemption and should be invalidated.
THE SECTION 7 TEST: THE ADDITIONAL RESTRAINTS
ON PREHIRE AGREEMENTS
The Supreme Court in Local 357, International Brotherhood of
Teamsters v. NLRB 21 established the threshold test for determining
whether the practices of a union or employer have violated an em-
ployee's section 7 rights. Respondent Slater, a union member, cus-
tomarily had sought employment through the union hiring hall. In
August, 1955, however, he obtained casual employment with an em-
ployer signatory to a hiring-hall agreement without having been dis-
patched by the union. Slater's employer discharged him several
months later after the union complained that Slater had circumvented
rewarding those employees who have chosen to work in units represented by
(the Union)." International Photographers of the Motion Picture Indus., Local
659 (MPO-TV of California Inc.), 197 N.L.R.B. 1187, 1189 [1972] NLRB Dec.
24,388 (1972), enforced, 477 F.2d 450 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
1157 (1974) (footnotes omitted), as quoted in Bechtel Power Corp., 223 N.L.R.B.
925, 933 [1975-76] NLRB Dec. 16,750 (1976), modified, 229 N.L.R.B. No. 84,
[1977-78] NLRB Dec. 18,159 (1977).
20. 227 N.L.R.B. at -, [1976-77] NLRB Dec. at 29,618.
21. 365 U.S. 667 (1961).
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the hiring hall in violation of the collective bargaining agreement,
which provided:
Casual employees shall, wherever the Union maintains a
dispatching service, be employed only on a seniority basis
in the Industry whenever such senior employees are avail-
able.... Seniority rating of such employees shall begin with
a minimum of three months service in the Industry,
irrespective of whether such employee is or is not a member
of the Union.
.... No casual employee shall be employed by any em-
ployer who is a party to this Agreement in violation of
seniority status if such employees are available and if the
dispatching service for such employees is available.22
Slater alleged that the enforcement of this clause by the employer
and the union interfered with the exercise of his section 7 rights in
violation of sections 8(a) (1) and 8(b) (1), and encouraged union
membership by discriminating against him in violation of sections
8 (a) (3) and 8 (b) (1) (A) of the NLRA.23
Although the NLRB 24 and the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit 25 held that the hiring hall agreement was illegal
per se, the Supreme Court reversed, stating: "There being no express
ban of hiring halls in any provision of the [NLRA], those who add
one . . . engage in a legislative act. The [NLRA] deals with dis-
crimination either by the employers or unions that encourages or
22. Id. at 668.
23. Section 8 of the NLRA provides in pertinent part:
(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-
(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the
exercise of the rights guaranteed in section [7];
(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment
or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage
membership in any labor organization ...
(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or
its agents-
(1) to restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed in section [7] ... ;
(2) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate
against an employee in violation of subsection (a) (3) of this sec-
tion ....
29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1), (3), (b) (1) (A), (2) (1970).
24. Los Angeles-Seattle Motor Express, Inc., 121 N.L.R.B. 1629, 1630, [1958-
59] NLRB Dec. 1 55,818 (1958).
25. Local 357, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. NLRB, 275 F.2d 646, 647 (D.C. Cir.
1960).
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discourages union membership." 26 Finding the hiring-hall agreement
facially free from discrimination, the Court continued: "When an
employer and the union enforce the agreement against union mem-
bers we cannot say without more that either indulges in the kind of
discrimination to which the [NLRA] is addressed." 27 Thus, the
Supreme Court has concluded that the provisions of an agreement
establishing a hiring hall violate an employee's section 7 rights if
they either encourage or discourage union membership through
discrimination. If the agreement affects union membership through
means other than discrimination, however, the Local 357 test has not
been violated.28
Under the standard enunciated by the Court in Local 357, the prior-
ity system approved by the NLRB in Interstate Electric clearly would
violate an employee's section 7 rights if it required that he be a union
member to qualify for the highest priority referral group. 29 Instead,
the provision requires experience under the collective bargaining
agreement, which may be obtained by union and non-union workers
alike. A non-union member will not join the union to qualify for the
highest priority referral group, because both union and non-union
workers can achieve that status only after working under a collective
bargaining agreement for the required number of years. Because a
worker is neither benefited by union membership nor penalized for
the lack of it, the Interstate Electric priority referral term does not
discriminate to encourage union membership. Local 357 consequently
does not prohibit the provision's enforcement. 30
Nevertheless, Local 357 does not legitimize all prehire agreements
whose provisions do not conflict with the standard established in that
case. In Local 357 the union that negotiated the hiring hall agreement
had attained the status of majority representative. In a situation
involving a prehire agreement promulgated pursuant to section 8 (f),
however, the future employees have not had an opportunity to select
their representative. Consequently, the Supreme Court has intimated
that section 8(f) should be construed strictly so that the prehire
26. 365 U.S. at 674 (footnote omitted).
27. Id.
28. Id. at 675-76.
29. Such a requirement would perpetuate a closed shop, which has been out-
lawed by § 8(a) (3) of the NLRA. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (3) (1970). See, e.g.,
NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734, 740-41 (1963); Local 357, Int'l
Bhd. of Teamsters v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667, 673 (1961).
30. This analysis pertains only to the facial logic of the referral procedure ap-
proved in Interstate Electric and not to the practicalities of its application. A
more comprehensive examination would require a consideration of such factors
as the mechanics of the job market and the effect of psychological pressures.
[Vol. 19:203
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agreement does not prevent employees from later petitioning for an
election to designate a majority representative. 31
In NLRB v. Local 103, International Association of Bridge, Struc-
tural and Ornamental Workers 32 the Court accepted a very narrow
construction of section 8 (f). The Court agreed with the NLRB that
a union's picketing for more than thirty days without requesting an
election constituted an unfair labor practice under section 8 (b) (7) of
the NLRA,33 although the picketing's purpose was to enforce a pre-
hire agreement. 34 The occurrence of picketing before the employees
had been given an opportunity to vote on representation could inter-
fere with their right to select the bargaining agent of their choice.35
The Court recognized that section 8 (f) created a limited exception
to section 7, which ordinarily would prevent the negotiation of pre-
hire agreements, 3 and stated: "Except for § 8(f), neither the em-
ployer nor the union could execute prehire agreements without com-
mitting unfair labor practices." 37
In Local 103 section 8 (f)'s failure explicitly to authorize picketing
intended to force compliance with a prehire agreement influenced the
Court to accept the NLRB's decision restricting such practices.3 8 The
logical extension of Local 103, therefore, would be to invalidate, as
violative of section 7, those provisions that are contained in a prehire
contract but not authorized expressly by section 8(f). Consequently,
a valid priority clause must comply with the statutory policy enun-
ciated by the Congress in the language of section 8 (f).
SECTION 8 (F) : A DISCREPANCY 1BETWEEN CONGRESSIONAL
INTENT AND NLRB INTERPRETATION
The legislative history of section 8 (f) indicates that the priority of
referral for job applicants must be based on objective criteria. 0
Obviously, both employers and unions will be benefited maximally
when the most experienced and skilled construction workers receive
priority in job referral. Such a process would best fulfill Congress's
31. See NLRB v. Local 103, Int'l Ass'n of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental
Workers, 98 S. Ct. 651, 657-59 (1978); Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers Local 100,
421 U.S. 616, 632 (1975).
32. 98 S. Ct. 651 (1978).
33. 27 U.S.C. § 158(b) (7) (1970).
34. 98 S. Ct. at 656-61.
35. Id. at 658.
36. Id. at 657.
37. Id. at 659-60.
38. Id. at 658.
39. LEMILASiv HISTORY, supra note 1, at 424.
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policy goal of making available in the construction industry a ready
supply of skilled craftsmen. Similarly, both union and non-union con-
struction workers will gain confidence in the union's operation of its
hiring hall if its decisions in extending priority among potential em-
ployees are governed by such manifestly fair standards as experience
and skill.
Although the NLRA's legislative history does not define "objective
criteria," the meaning of that term may be derived from the context
of its usage in the committee reports. Congress enacted section 8 (f)
so that construction contractors could calculate labor costs before sub-
mitting bids on projects and could have a group of skilled workmen
available for speedy referral.40 Objective criteria, therefore, should
further the legislative purpose of providing contractors with con-
tinuous and ready access to a pool of experienced and skilled workers
at predictable labor costs, and any provision excluding workers from
the highest priority group should accommodate either one or both of
these interests. Likewise, an objective criterion should accord equal
treatment to all similarly situated workers.
Section 8 (f) (4) suggests three possible objective criteria that
may be used to establish the priority of employee referral from union
hiring halls: residence in a geographical area, experience in an in-
dustry, and service with an employer.41 The referral provision ap-
proved in Interstate Electric complies partially with all three of these
criteria. When implemented within the context of the NLRB's inter-
pretation of section 8(f) (4), however, the provision denies a top
priority classification to at least one important group of employees
and conflicts with Congress's goal of objectivity.
Section 8(f) Criteria
Residence in the Area
The establishment of a residence requirement as a criterion for
selection to the highest priority group would protect workers with
homes and families within a community against job competition from
itinerant laborers and would provide these stationary workers with
a measure of job security. This requirement is the least objective of
the three standards enunciated in section 8 (f) (4) because no general
correlation exists between a worker's area of residence and his exper-
ience or skill. The geographical restriction, however, does encourage
40. Id.
41. NLRA, § 8(f) (4), 29 U.S.C. § 158(f) (4) (1970). For the pertinent text of
§ 8(f) (4) see note 6 supra.
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workers to settle in a particular area and thereby promotes the
maintenance of a stable pool of employees from which a contractor
may draw. The Interstate Electric priority referral mechanism ful-
fills the goal of protecting workers in a geographical area: to qualify
for top priority status, an employee must live in or near the area
covered by the collective bargaining agreement at least long enough
to obtain the requisite experience under the contract. The classifi-
cation system is not truly objective, however, because not all workers
who have lived in the area for the required number of years receive
a top priority ranking. Hence, the provision cannot be justified fully
as a geographical restriction.
Experience in an Industry
A contract provision extending a preference in referral to those
employees with the most experience in their respective trades can be
very beneficial to employers, providing assurance that the contractor
will have access to the most capable personnel available. An objective
industry experience requirement should award priority to all em-
ployees in the relevant trade who have worked a designated number
,of years, except as its scope permissibly might be limited by a bona
fide residency restriction or a requirement of service with an em-
ployer. In addition to requiring experience in the trade, however, the
Interstate Electric criterion would extend a top priority classification
only to those workers who previously had worked under a collective
bargaining agreement. This provision prevents some highly skilled
employees from obtaining priority in referral merely because they
have never worked pursuant to a prehire agreement; consequently,
it fails to qualify simply as a term establishing an industrial ex-
perience requirement.
Service With an Employer
A third suggested criterion through which employees may be
granted priority pursuant to section 8(f) (4) would establish a
"length of service with such employer" classification. Although this
type of requirement is stricter than the industry experience provision,
it provides an even greater benefit to the employer. Workers who
qualify under this criterion not only have experience in the industry
but also are familiar with the employer's particular operations. In
protecting those persons who have worked with a single company,
the service with an employer provision also promotes a lower turn-
over rate in the construction industry.
Nevertheless, the NLRB's opinion in Interstate Electric construed
the term "such employer" in section 8 (f) (4) to include not only indi-
19771
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vidual employers but also members of signatory multi-employer
associations.42 If the NLRB's interpretation is correct, the advantage
to an employer of using this third criterion to establish a priority
referral system is eliminated. Because they would lack the requisite
experience under the contract, the long-term employees of a com-
pany that enters a multi-employer bargaining agreement would be
ineligible for a top priority status, although they are the persons
Congress intended to protect through its adoption of the "such em-
ployer" criterion. The company might be required to discharge its
longstanding employees so that it could hire other workers who, al-
though unfamiliar with the business operations of their new em-
ployer, nevertheless previously had worked under the contract and
attained a privileged classification. Thus, the NLRB's interpretation
of "such employer" not only threatens the job security of those per-
sons Congress intended to protect but also promotes an increased
rate of employee turnover in the industry.
If Congress had envisioned the construction of "such employer"
adopted by the NLRB in Interstate Electric, it probably would not
have enacted the provision permitting a priority system to be based
on service with an employer. The less restrictive criterion of ex-
perience in the industry could have permitted the referral of workers
whose overall capabilities and whose knowledge of a particular com-
pany's operations were indistinguishable from those attributes of
employees who worked under a multi-employer collective bargaining
agreement. Although the enforcement of a priority provision under
the NLRB's interpretation of "such employer" does not discriminate
per se by requiring union membership to qualify for priority referral,
it clearly forces an employee into unnecessary union contact inas-
much as it discriminates against those workers who previously have
not sought employment under the prehire agreement. Consequently,
the Interstate Electric priority provision should not be upheld under
the NLRB's interpretation of "such employer" because it could re-
quire the discharge of workers whom Congress intended to protect.
The priority provisions approved in Interstate Electric clearly are
unacceptable as geographical, experience in the industry, or service
with an employer restrictions. Nevertheless, the legislative history of
section 8 (f) indicates that these three criteria were not exclusive but
merely were illustrative of the types of priority provisions that could
be incorporated into a prehire agreement. 43 Even as a separate cri-
terion, however, the Interstate Electric clause is invalid: in requiring
42. See text accompanying note 20 supra.
43. LEGIsLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 1, at 424.
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service under the contract, it creates a preferred employee group
without providing any corresponding benefit to the employer.44
"SUCH EMPLOYER": AN ALTERNATIVE INTERPRETATION
The NLRB's interpretation of "such employer" excludes from a
preferred status one employee group that Congress had intended
to protect under all of the three criteria enumerated in section 8 (f).
These workers comprise the longstanding employees of a company
that has been located in the geographical area of the union for an
extended time period and that has entered into a multi-employer pre-
hire agreement with the union. If the contract contains a priority
provision requiring experience under the agreement, these employees
risk the possibility of discharge.45 This potential consequence should
render the provision invalid unless the referral mechanism could be
construed to protect these workers. If the term "such employer" in
section 8(f) (4) meant a single employer, its application could not
lead to the discharge of the long term employees of a company that
enters a prehire agreement containing a referral mechanism similar
to that used in Interstate Electric. Because no employees would have
worked under the contract, none would qualify as a top priority
worker, and, unless the company's employees were excluded by a valid
geographical or industry experience restriction, 46 they would be in-
cluded in the highest priority referral class established under the
agreement. The workers thus could choose to remain in the con-
tractor's employ under the bargaining agreement. Moreover, the
company's longstanding employees would be among the first workers
to acquire the requisite experience under the contract and thereby
to qualify as members of the top priority referral group.4 7
44. See text accompanying notes 40-41 supra.
45. All other employees excluded by the Interstate Electric referral provision
could be denied top priority status through the implementation of restrictions
establishing geographical, experience in the industry, and service with an em-
ployer requirements.
46. For example, all of the employees of a company moving into an area and
entering a hiring hall agreement validly could be subordinated under § 8(f) (4)
in favor of local employees. See text accompanying note 41 supra.
47. If a long-term employee had quit his job or was discharged prior to or
during the initial period that the agreement was in force, he could not acquire
sufficient experience under the contract to be a member of the preferred referral
class. Consequently, the employer might be prevented from rehiring the employee,
after other workers had qualified as members of the highest priority referral
group. This result might be permissible because § 8(f) (4) may not protect an
applicant who, during a period of unemployment, might have become unfamiliar
with the employer's current practices.
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Absent the single employer construction of the term "such em-
ployer," the Interstate Electric referral provision is illegal. 48 Many of
the employees excluded from the top priority group by that referral
mechanism could be eliminated validly through the enforcement of
geographical, industrial experience, and service with an employer
requirements. Nevertheless, any worker who has been denied a
preferred status under an Interstate Electric clause, whether or not
a member of the employee group to whom Congress intended to give
priority, should be permitted to challenge the legality of the referral
provision. Certainly, no union should be allowed to accomplish an
otherwise permissible objective through unlawful means.4 9
CONCLUSION
Under the NLRB's interpretation of "such employer" in section
8 (f) (4) of the NLRA, the effect of the priority referral provision
approved in Interstate Electric could deprive some contractors of
their most experienced workers. Because this result conflicts with
Congress's intent in enacting the section 8 (f) exemption, it also
contravenes the section 7 rights of those employees discharged
through the provision's enforcement. If the NLRB's interpretation
of "such employer" is reversed, however, the referral term could
protect adequately those job applicants Congress intended to favor
and would comply with section 8 (f).
48. The NLRB's construction of the term "such employer" to include a multi-
employer bargaining unit could create unwarranted results in situations other
than when the collective bargaining agreement required the top priority referral
group to have experience under the contract. For example, if a contractor ac-
cepted a referral provision that required the top priority class to have two
years experience with an employer, it would be required to extend a preference
to those employees who had worked the requisite time in the unit, regardless of
whether those workers were familiar with the particular employer's operations.
This provision would be similar to a requirement of experience in the industry.
By excluding all persons who did not work within the employer unit, however,
the restriction would reduce the number of potentially qualified job applicants
without providing any corresponding benefit to the employers. Such a discrimi-
natory elimination of skilled workers from the employee pool probably would
not comply with § 8(f). Consequently, the problems created by the NLRB's con-
struction of "such employer" suggest strongly that the interpretation is in-
correct. Rather, the term should include employers only on an individual basis.
49. Cf. Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers Local 100, 421 U.S. 616, 625 (1975)
(union's actions not immune from antitrust laws merely because ultimate goal
is lawful).
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